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National Subscription Television v. S & H, TV: The
Problem of Unauthorized Interception of
Subscription Television-Are the Legal
Airwaves Unscrambled?
The unending stream of technological innovations that best exemplifies
the electronic media has left the law in its wake. Because of rapid ad-
vancements in the forms communications may take, the law has sometimes
been slow in effectively and rationally affording protection against the
piracy of these new types of electronic media. One such type of electronic
media is the transmission of over-the-air scrambled broadcasts, more prop-
erly "subscription" television, wherein a party pays a subscription fee to
receive nonstandard television programming. National Subscription Tele-
vision v. S & H, TV, in view of prior divided case law, settled the question
of whether a subscription television operator is entitled to legal protection
against the unauthorized interception and/or use of his transmissions. The
author traces the historical development of cable TV and the particularized
technologies thereof, the rules and policies of the Federal Communications
Commission as they relate to subscription television, and lastly, makes
some forecasts as to the implications of the National decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the entertainment industry, as a whole, has suffered
from the pains of copyright infringement, so too, certain cable tel-
evision services have experienced their own unique brand of
product pilferage. The problem which confronts cable television,*
particularly "subscription television" (STV), is the sanctity of the
STV signal. Shortly after STV had achieved some sort of promi-
nence as an entertainment product, devices capable of accessing
and decoding STV emissions became available both in the black
and open markets. Those interested in pirating2 the transmis-
sions of STV operations provided a ready market for these inde-
pendently produced and marketed 3 devices. Thus, these devices,
1. The use of the term "cable" television when referring to subscription tele-
vision (STV) is actually a misnomer because STV is devoid of cable in its carriage
of the television signal. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
2. In this area of unauthorized interception of encoded visual signals,
"piracy" is a term of art connoting the usurpation of STV broadcasts for oneself or
for others, without consideration paid to the sender and with or without the per-
mission of the sender. See generally Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp.
525, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
3. These signal converters were produced and marketed independently of
once placed in the stream of commerce, were consumed rapidly
by the public. The STV industry perceived this independent pro-
duction and sale of decoders, if left unchecked, as potentially
causing the ruin of STV as a viable cable television system. Sim-
ply put, the industry asked how an STV oriented cable enterprise
could remain economically feasible if its signal was subject to vir-
tually free viewing.
In response to the threat of piracy, STV operators sought relief
from the courts. 4 Early decisions considering this problem, how-
ever, failed to provide STV operator/plaiptiffs adequate relief.5
Adding further to the plight of both the courts and the STV indus-
try, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) failed to as-
sist in the clarification of the Communications Act of 19346 and its
effect on the STV industry.7 The most recent case to address this
issue of unauthorized interception of STV emissions was National
Subscription Television v. S & H, TV.8 In National, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an STV
operator was entitled to relief under the Communications Act
where the defendants had been distributing for profit devices ca-
pable of decoding the operator's broadcast. Seemingly, the deci-
sion rendered in National has put an end to the question of
whether STV operations are entitled to the protections afforded
by the Communications Act.9
Cable television systems, as they exist presently, are normally
of two types. The first is known as subscription television,O while
the second is referred to as "cablecasting."' The former, being
the cable technology discussed in National, involves a scrambled
any consultation or authorization by the STV operators whose transmissions these
devices were capable of decoding. National Subscription Television v. S & H, TV,
644 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1981).
4. The kinds of relief sought were monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Complimenting the plea for federal relief, state relief was also normally requested.
Id. at 821. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) is the leading
case recognizing that a private individual has a right of action for a violation of 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1976 & Supp. 1981). See also Chartwell Communication Group v.
Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1980).
5. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
6. Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-60 (Supp. 11 1979)).
7. See notes 59, 106, 117, and 200 infra and accompanying text.
8. 644 F.2d 820.
9. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.641(b) (Supp. 11 1979) states: "Subscription television
broadcast program. A television broadcast program intended to be received in in-
telligible form by members of the public only for a fee or charge." See Home Box
Office Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525, 526-27. See also note 21 infra.
11. Cablecasting is defined as programming exclusive of broadcast signals,
carried directly on a closed cable system. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(V) (1980). See also
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1972), in which the
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video signal broadcast, while the latter carries television pro-
gramming directly to a customer's home via a closed cable sys-
tem, thus avoiding the over-the-air transmission process. STV
operators lease decoders to their subscribers enabling them to
unscramble and view the STV broadcast signal.12 These decod-
ers, after attachment to a conventional television set, allow the
viewer to intelligently13 view the STV programming. Analogous
to regular television signals, any television set is capable of re-
ceiving the STV signal, though in scrambled form. The ability of
STV to be received by all television sets, even in the absence of
modifying devices, has proven problematical to the FCC, the
courts, and the STV industry.14
This note will discuss STV as a species of cable television tech-
nology. The primary focus of the text will be upon the legal as-
pects inherent to this specialized form of communication. Also to
be considered is the impact of the National decision on the cable
television industry at large, placing special emphasis on the his-
torical, linguistical, and decisional elements underlying the
court's disposition of the case.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence of Cable Television
Cable television was originally developed in an effort to provide
satisfactory television viewing opportunities in those areas of the
United States where conventional, advertiser-supported television
reception was poor or nonexistent.15 Although many of the larger
cities and communities had their own television stations, most of
the outlying areas of the country were without television service.
Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the FCC to issue a regulation requiring
origination of programming by cable systems having 3,500 or more subscribers.
12. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires that STV oper-
ators lease, not sell decoders to their subscribers. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(f) (3) (1980).
The legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned that should STV oper-
ations cease in a certain community it did not want subscribers burdened with
useless decoders for which they might have paid a substantial sum. H.R. REP. No.
501-08, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1969).
13. Intelligent viewing describes the ability to view a clear and unscrambled
television program.
14. The ability to receive STV signals by all television sets significantly sup-
ported arguments made that STV was indeed intended for the use of the general
public. This would later prove to be unsound. See text accompanying notes 119 &
140 infra.
15. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 4-5 (1979).
Compounding the matter, not only did those areas have no televi-
sion station(s) of their own because of their inability to economi-
cally support such a business,16 but due to the topography and/or
location of the community, signal reception from distant televi-
sion stations was impossible without special equipment. 17 Thus,
those remote communities began to implement the first type of
cable television: community antenna television (CATV).18 A
CATV system operates by using a low cost community antenna
which, after picking up the distant television transmissions, redis-
tributes the signal by a network of cable directly to the viewer's
home.19 CATV was widely accepted 20 because it made available,
at low cost, distant television programming for those in television-
starved communities.
Following CATV's emergence, broadcasters developed the STV
system of cable television.2 1 STV subscribers could receive origi-
nally produced programming in addition to distant conventional
television service. By charging for the service, independent
broadcasters had an economically feasible method of transmitting
television to remote communities of small size. Without the abil-
ity to charge for the service, the operation of an independent sta-
tion would have been foreclosed because of economic realities. 22
Those who were engaged in CATV operations began to realize
16. Advertiser supported television could not subsist in a community of small
size because advertisers of any means (and they were usually the advertisers who
were willing to pay the advertising fees required if a station were to be viable)
took their business to television stations in larger communities that had access to
a greater population base. Moreover, even if a station ventured to operate in one
of these small communities and did not originate its own programming which was
costly, it had to pay for the use of "network" programming which was many times
prohibitively expensive.
17. Conceivably, a resident of one of these remote communities could track
and receive distant television signals if he installed a special antenna, but few did
SO.
18. See D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 68 (1973).
19. "CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, am-
plify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute them
by wire to the receivers of their subscribers." United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
[They] perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supple-
ment broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in
adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible;
and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant sta-
tions entirely beyond the range of local antenna.
Id. at 163. See also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at 650 n.1
(1972).
20. In 1952 there were 70 CATV systems in operation, and by 1959 there were
560. 39 TELEVISION FACTBOOK 72a, 79a (Television Digest, 1972).
21. See First Report, 23 F.C.C.2d 532, 542-43 (1957).
22. The reasoning was if a proposed television station was precluded because
it could not rely solely on advertiser revenue, a station might be able to succeed if
its audience paid a monthly fee for its television service. See note 16 supra.
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that STV systems and their programming mix of original and dis-
tant broadcasts were marketable. They began to apply this pro-
gram and marketing technique to their own cable systems.
Cablecasting, as it came to be known, continued to provide repro-
duction of distant broadcasts. Additionally, however, it offered
original programming, for an increased fee, similar to STV type
operations.23 That form of cable television offered its customers
first-run movies, sporting events, and special features without
commercial interruption.24
In summary, CATV, the forerunner of cable television, was con-
ceived in the 1950's.25 STV took the idea of rebroadcasting distant
television signals and expanded on it by supplementing rebroad-
casts with original programming, all for a price.26 Cable television
evolved even further in the early 1970's when the coupling of
CATV and STV methodologies produced cablecasting.27 Cable-
casting provided both distant broadcasts and original program-
ming by cable for a fee. So, within a span of twenty years, cable
television more resembled an independent producer of programs
than a mere middleman for the reproduction of distant television
signals.
B. Cable Television and the Role of the Federal
Communications Commission
The discovery of radio signals and their component technology
spawned a new industry in the early 1920's. 28 The radio broadcast
media provided business entrepreneurs, for the first time, not
only widespread access to potential customers, but also, unlike
the printed media, the opportunity to enter the home and appeal
to customers orally. Thus, radio stations began to appear and
23. Cablecasting, in effect, is STV without over-the-air broadcasting. Cable-
casting provides the same types of programs as STV, but differs in the means used
to transmit the programming to the subscriber's home.
24. The dominant form of cable TV today is of this type. See HAMBURG, supra
note 15, at 20-26.
25. See LEDUC, supra note 18.
26. STV was like CATV in that it retransmitted television programs of distant
television stations. However, it was different in that it used scrambled signals
broadcast over-the-air and supplemented its retransmissions with original pro-
gramming of its own selection.
27. Cf. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. at 653-54 (describing
rules adopted to compensate for the growth of cable TV).
28. J. BrrrER, MASS COMMUNICATION 95-103 (1977).
prosper without the apparent need for state regulation.2 9
Within a short time, however, radio operations had materialized
at such a prolific rate that the industry was crippling itself.30
Broadcasters transmitted their programs using whatever fre-
quency they desired. In the absence of state regulation of a lim-
ited broadcast spectrum, 31 broadcasters were encroaching upon
one another's signals at the expense of none of them being heard
clearly. Ghosting of signals,32 signal overlap,33 and occasional to-
tal loss of signal was the norm, not the exception.3 4 The situation
deteriorated to such an extent that Congress was compelled to in-
tervene by passing the Radio Act of 192735 in an attempt to regu-
late access to the limited broadcast spectrum.
As technology continued to improve and expand, Congress was
again forced to evaluate the status of the telecommunications in-
dustry,36 ultimately deciding that the Radio Act of 1927 was inade-
quate and that a new communications act was needed.
Responding to this need, Congress promulgated the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.37 The Act mandated that the Federal Communi-
cations Commission was to be created and empowered to oversee
the rates and services provided by communications common car-
riers and broadcast licensees. 38 The purpose behind the Act was
"to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United
States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges . . "39
29. Durinj the formative years of radio, there were so few radio stations in op-
eration that there was no immediate need to regulate the use of the airwaves.
Room was left for random broadcasting with no possibility of interference with
other operators.
30. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
31. There is a technologically limited broadcast spectrum, and only so many
frequencies may be simultaneously used without causing interference with each
other.
32. Ghosting of signals is an unwanted secondary signal that is received in
conjunction with the stronger primary signal.
33. Signal overlap is caused where two transmissions using the same fre-
quency are broadcast simultaneously.
34. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
.35. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
36. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by letter to Congress on February 26,
1934, requested that Congress in its next session abolish the Federal Radio Com-
mission and replace it with the Federal Communication Commission giving such
Commission the authority over "services (relying] on wires, cables, or radio as a
medium of transmission." President's Message to Congress Recommending Crea-
tion of the FCC, - submitted to Barbara.
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
38. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-22 (1976) (common carrier provision) and 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-
86 (broadcasting provisions).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
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Soon after the enactment of the Communications 'Act, broad-
cast television began to flourish. Television presented the same
problems that early radio had on the use of the airwaves, i.e.,
electrical interference and the need to utilize a limited broadcast
spectrum. 40 It seemed natural that the FCC would become the
regulating authority of television broadcasting because the source
of the FCC's authority eminated from a congressional intent to
have controlled access to the limited broadcast spectrum.4 1 Fur-
thermore, the Communications Act had specifically provided for
the regulation of radio transmitted pictures. 42 The birth of com-
munity antenna television would later retest the scope of the
FCC's regulating authority over electronic communications.
Although cable television had been in existence since the
1940's,43 it was not until 1952 that the FCC first directed its regu-
lating eye toward CATV. In that year, the Commission issued a
memorandum which raised two fundamental issues: "(1) Do
such operations" constitute broadcasting within the meaning...
of the Act . . . or (2) do such operations constitute interstate
common carrier operations within the meaning ... of the Act." 45
The resolution of these questions and their consequences would
come to be of enormous importance to the young cable television
industry. The FCC, pursuant to the Communications Act, had ex-
press jurisdiction only over common carriers6 or broadcasters. 47
40. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
41. See note 31 supra.
42. The FCC was entrusted to regulate "'Radio communication' . . . [mean-
ing] transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all
kinds ..... " (emphasis added). 47 U.S.C. § 153(b).
43. See generally Marticorena, Recent Developments in Cable Television Law,
6 ORANGE CouNTY B.J. 152 (1979).
44. It must be noted that in the early part of the 1950's, cable television con-
sisted almost exclusively of cablecasting, and STV was of little consequence.
Therefore, the FCC determined that it could not regulate cable TV, which meant
CATV or cablecasting operations, not STV. The FCC held that Title III of the
Communications Act did not apply because CATV operations were not broadcast-
ing; they were using point-to-point communications (microwave) and cable deliv-
ery systems. The discretionary area was whether these types of electronic
communications constitute common carriage. Apparently, at this time, the FCC
did not believe so. See notes 38 supra & 51 infra; see also HAMBURG, supra note
15, at 6.
45. REVIEW OF ALLOCATION PROBLEMS OF TV SERVICE TO SMALL COMMUNITIES
490, BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. print 1958).
46. See note 38 supra.
47. Id.
If cable television was held to be outside of either classification,
the Commission was without authority to regulate cable televi-
sion. Initially, the FCC declined to involve itself in the overseeing
of the cable television industry, perhaps due to limited re-
sources8 rather than a loss of concern for such regulation. Never-
theless, the FCC did issue certain regulations 49 in 1956 concerning
permissible levels of electronic transmissions by cable television
operators.
While the FCC was attempting to formulate its cable television
policy with respect to CATV, subscription television services ap-
peared. Subscription television, which was broadcast directly into
the atmosphere like conventional television broadcasting, was
promptly held by the FCC to be within the parameters of the
Communications Act.50
Contrary to what appeared to be a propensity to assume regula-
tion of CATV, as indicated by the 1956 regulations, the FCC in
1958 refused to assert regulatory authority over cable television,
denying that CATV was a form of common carriage and thus sub-
ject to Title II of the Communications Act.51 The rationale behind
the FCC staff decision was that the subscribers of CATV were un-
able to select the messages (programming) they might receive.5 2
The FCC also decided that cable television operations did not
constitute broadcasting pursuant to Title I of the Communica-
tions Act.53
Those events were followed in 1959 by the First Report and Or-
der54 drafted by the FCC regarding the influence, inter alia, of
cable television on the evolution of conventional broadcast televi-
sion. In essence, the "Report" displayed the FCC's reluctance to
promulgate any rules concerning the cable television industry ab-
48. The FCC might have been reluctant to act because of its limited staff. It
might have believed that because of this limitation it could not adequately remedy
the problems claimed to exist due to the growth of cable television. See HAMBURG,
supra note 15, at 6.
49. In re Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Governing Re-
stricted Radiation Devices, 13 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1546(a) (1956).
50. First Report and Order, 23 F.C.C. 532 (1957), wherein the FCC determined
it had the authority to require STV operators to obtain licensing, which required
trial demonstrations of such service before commencing operations.
51. See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-55 (1958). Title
II of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to regulate common carriers.
See note 38 supra.
52. This rationale was also offered in support of the FCC's refusal to assert ju-
risdiction over CATV in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
53. This section authorized the FCC to regulate broadcasters using the limited
broadcast spectrum. See 24 F.C.C. at 255-56. See also note 43 supra.
54. In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Trans-
lators, TV Satellites and TV Repeaters in the Orderly Development of Television
Broadcasting, 18 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1573 (1959).
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sent congressional impetus.5 5 Pressure began to mount at this
time for the FCC to take action. Television broadcasters were
claiming that the incredible growth of cable television systems,
primarily CATV systems, was threatening their existence, and the
FCC should act to curb the unfettered expansion of the cable tele-
vision industry.5 6 Camouflaging their response to this call for
assistance, the FCC's Broadcast Bureau, in 1961, denied a cable
operator a microwave license to service an additional community.
The Commission denied the license because it first wanted to
study the impact the proposed cable introduction would have on
the already existing conventional television station within the
targeted community. The Commission found that the expansion,
if consummated, would have an adverse effect economically on
the existing television station and therefore refused to grant the
microwave license. 57 By so regulating the issuance of microwave
transmitting licenses, the FCC had asserted vicarious authority
over CATV without having to make a formalized assertion of reg-
ulating authority58
The FCC promulgated another First Report and Order and is-
sued a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
1965. 59 Those documents notified cable operators that the FCC
was formally asserting jurisdiction over all types of "cable" televi-
sion systems, but they did not specify the degree of authority to
be exerted by the FCC. A Second Report and Order 6O was
adopted in 1966; it annotated the 1965 rules and had the effect of
further regulating the cable television industry.61 In 1968 the
55. Id. at 1604.
56. See HAMBURG, supra note 15, at 9-10.
57. This decision was upheld in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC,
321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) aff'g 52 F.C.C. 459 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963).
58. By restricting CATV's access to microwave facilities, the FCC could indi-
rectly regulate microwave dependent CATV. There appears to be no reason, other
than the exigencies of the Carter Mountain case, that would indicate why the FCC
chose this method of regulation instead of directly promulgating a set of rules to
control the CATV situation, as it eventually did in 1965 when the FCC adopted its
First Report and Order and issued a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 45 (1965).
59. Id.
60. 6 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1717 (1966).
61. This ruling was subsequently amended in 1968 with the issuance of Notice
of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in (Docket 18397) FCC 68-1176 (re-
leased December 12, 1968).
Commission developed a nationwide scheme of STV regulation6 2
and in 1972 published its Cable Television Rules,63 which, as
amended, are the basic rules and regulations presently effecting
the federal regulation of cable television.
C. The Meaning of Broadcast
1. Sections 605 and 153(o)
During cable television's birth and subsequent development,
the regulating authorities (the FCC, municipalities, and the
courts) were preoccupied with protecting the public interest.64
Therefore, those authorities concentrated their efforts on devising
regulations which would be broad enough to foster the beneficial
growth of the cable television industry, but also narrow enough to
protect the public interest. The issue of whether STV, as a form
of cable television, was to be entitled legislative or court
originated protection from the unauthorized use of its transmis-
sions was not discussed.66 Left for another day, the eventual an-
swer to that question would be a collage of judicial
interpretations pooling the meaning of broadcast; how a broad-
caster's choice of delivery system evidenced his intent, or lack of
intent, to broadcast to the general public; and how the rulings
made by the FCC related to the concept of broadcasting.
Section 605 of the Communications Act provides:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18,66 no person. . . assisting
in receiving ...any interstate... communication by wire or radio shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or
reception, [further] ... [nmo person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the exist-
ence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall
receive or assist in receiving any interstate ... communication by radio
62. Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.643 (1976).
63. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). The FCC, by
asserting its jurisdiction over cable operations, triggered many lawsuits challeng-
ing such authority. The leading case disposing of the question is United States v.
Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968), where the Supreme Court affirmed the
jurisdiction of the FCC over cable operators stating "the Commission has reason-
ably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to per-
form with appropriate effectiveness certain of its responsibilities." Id.
64. See Marticorena, supra note 43, at 155-56.
65. The first judicial decision to discuss the issue of whether STV was within
the reach of section 605 was Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). See text accompanying note 90 infra.
66. Sanctions Against Interception of Wire and Oral Communications, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968). This chapter describes when it is lawful to intercept pri-
vate communications. This section was enacted to allow for law enforcement
agencies to have a means to intercept communications.
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and use [of] such communication (or any information therein contained)
for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto ...
[with the proviso that] [t]his section shall not apply to the receiving, di-
vulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication
which is broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or othersfor the use of the
general public .... 67
That section prohibits any interception, either personally or by
aiding others in the interception, of communications made by
wire or radio68 without the permission of the sender, unless the
subject communication is broadcast by the sender for the use of
the general public.
Section 153(o) of the Communications Act defines broadcasting
as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be re-
ceived by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay sta-
tions."69 Thus, because section 605 does not define what is meant
by broadcasting, and the legislative history fails in the same re-
spect,70 most courts have presumed that section 153(o)'s defini-
tion of broadcast was the correct view of what constituted
broadcasting for the use of the general public.7 1
2. The Sender's Intent
The premiere case discussing the problem of distinguishing be-
tween broadcast telecommunications and nonbroadcast telecom-
munications within the meaning of section 153(o) was Functional
Music, Inc. v. FCC.72 As an FM radio station, Functional Music
provided commerical businesses with a music subscription serv-
ice wherein commercials and nonmusical segments of the sta-
tion's regular broadcast were electronically edited from the
broadcast by devices specially installed to the subscriber's radio
receiver.73 Functional Music employed a "simplex"74 mode of
67. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (emphasis added). The 1968 amendment to this section in-
serted the introductory clause "(elxcept as authorized by chapter 119. Title 18"
and substituted "intercepted" for "obtained" in the fourth sentence. Pub. L. No.
90-351, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112.
68. In Allen B. DuMont Laboratories v. Carrol, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951), it was held that television broadcasts were within the
regulatory reach of the FCC.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o).
70. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
71. See Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 681 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 39
(C.D. Cal. 1967); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
72. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
73. Id. at 545 n.4 defined a simplex system as an "allocated FM channel sup-
porting but one FM signal. Licensees engaged in a functional music service emit-
broadcasting, which required the use of special equipment capa-
ble of simultaneously transmitting FM and electronic signals to
the hybrid receivers immediately before and after each nonmusic
interruption. In 1955, the FCC ruled7 5 that licensed FM broadcast-
ers could not superimpose a simplex signal on an FM signal and
that a simplex signal was considered a form of point-to-point com-
munication.76 The "1955 Rules" were postulated on the premise
that background music programs were produced for the interests
of a limited group of listeners, and, as such, simplex signals were
not produced in the interest of the general public.77 Therefore,
because the FCC issued licenses to broadcast on the FM band
based on promoting the public interest, a new licensing process
was necessary if the public interest were to be protected. 78 Dis-
turbed by the 1955 Rules, Functional Music sued the FCC. 79 At
trial the FCC argued that its decision to view simplex as point-to-
point communication instead of broadcasting pursuant to section
153(o) was founded on "[Functional Music's] presentation of a
highly specialized program format, deletion of advertising from
subscriber's receivers, and exaction of a charge for these services
... .,"80 The court of appeals rejected the FCC's conclusions,
holding that simplex transmissions were broadcasts as defined by
section 153(o) because the signals transmitted by Functional Mu-
sic were intended for the receipt by the public.81 Finding Func-
ted a single signal capable of reaching both subscribers and the listening public
74. Id.
75. See 274 F.2d at 545 n.5. Later codified as 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1150 (1978), 73.293
(1963), and 73.295 (1964), these rules were first referred to as the "1955 Rules" and
directed functional music programmers (those programmers using simplex) to
phase out simplex and to begin using multiplex, which allowed for the transmis-
sion of multiple signals upon one allocated FM channel without the need to super-
impose the signals on one another.
76. Point-to-point transmissions are made directly from the sender to receiver
and are generally immune from reception by conventional receiving devices.
77. This reasoning proves to be unsound because the music portion of the pro-
gram was heard by all listeners regardless of whether they were a simplex sub-
scriber or not. To say that commercials and announcer portions of the program
make the program more beneficial to the general public is illusory. See Functional
Music, 274 F.2d at 545.
78. The Commission created a Subsidiary Communications Authorization
(SCA) wherein a licensed FM broadcaster could engage in functional music pro-
gramming under certain conditions. 47 C.F.R. § 73.293 (1980). See also 274 F.2d at
545 n.5.
79. Functional Music urged the court to "expunge" the multiplexing require-
ments of the FCC, because it seemed inconsistent with the FCC's authorization of
subscription television services on frequencies normally allocated to conventional
broadcast television. 274 F.2d at 545 n.6.
80. 274 F.2d at 548.
81. Id. at 548-49. The court stated further that although Functional's simplex
programming was specialized, this was just another factor to be weighed in deter-
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tional's simplex transmissions within the ambit of section 153(o),
the court said, "broadcasting remains broadcasting even though a
segment of those capable of receiving the broadcast signal are
equipped to delete a portion of that signal."82 After the Func-
tional decision, it appeared that if one intended to broadcast his
signal to the general public it would constitute "broadcasting" as
envisioned by section 153(o).
In 1967, a case was handed down in the Central District of Cali-
fornia which also addressed the issue of whether a subscription
radio program was broadcasting within the meaning of section
153(o). KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette
Vendors Corp. 83 involved a multiplex8 4 broadcaster, KMLA, which
furnished background music programming to commercial estab-
lishments. Like Functional Music, KMLA rented special equip-
ment to its subscribers so they could receive its background
music program. However, unlike Functional Music's use of a sim-
plex system, KMLA's multiplex system could not be picked up by
conventional radio sets absent the modifying devices supplied by
KMLA. Twentieth Century was in the business of supplying and
servicing cigarette vending machines, primarily to restaurants.
As an incentive to prospective customers, Twentieth Century of-
fered to provide special receiving devices, without KMLA's ap-
proval, which would enable its customers to receive the multiplex
program transmitted by KMLA. After discovering the acts of
Twentieth Century, KMLA instituted an action to enjoin Twenti-
eth Century from continuing its activities under section 605. Find-
ing for KMLA, the court agreed with the FCC ruling, which was
rejected by the Functional court, that multiplex and similar radio
subscription services (i.e. simplex) should be regarded as point-
to-point communications and not as "broadcasting."85 Further-
more, the court cited a ruling made by the FCC with respect to
the relationship between section 605 and multiplex programming,
wherein the FCC determined that section 605 would be contra-
vened if multiplex signals were intercepted absent authorization
from the sender.8 6 The KMLA court formulated its concept of
mining whether simplex was broadcasting and should not be controlling in the
matter. Id.
82. Id. at 548.
83. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
84. See note 75 supra.
85. 264 F. Supp. at 41. See also note 75 supra.
86. The Commission stated at 11 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1599 (1955), that:
broadcasting, as embodied in the exception to section 605 and, as
the Functional court had done, on the basis of the sender's in-
tent.87 The court said "[t]he question of whether KMLA's multi-
plex transmissions over its subcarrier frequency constitute
'broadcasting' so as to make the protections of section 605 inappli-
cable because of the proviso . . . hinges on whether KMLA in-
tended dissemination of its multiplex radio communication to the
general public."8 8 If KMLA intended to transmit its program to
the general public, the exception to section 605 was activated, but
if this intent was lacking, the protections of section 605 were effec-
tive. Thus, after KMLA, the intent of the subscription service op-
erator was the crucial element to be analyzed in determining if
section 605 was to be effective in cases of unauthorized intercep-
tions or whether the exception would become controlling, thereby
removing the subject transmission from the reach of section 605.89
3. MDS Systems and Cable Television
Whereas Functional and KMLA considered the rights of sub-
scription radio services, later cases would involve the rights of
subscription television operators. The first of these television
cases was Home Box Office v. Pay TV of Greater New York.90 In
that case, Home Box Office (HBO), which used a Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service (MDS), sought an injunction against a former li-
Although we have considered the applications of Section 605 in this mat-
ter, we wish to note that the question of the applicability of this Section
will, in all probability, be determined by court actions. However, it is our
opinion that Section 605 would be contravened by the unauthorized recep-
tion of the FlM signal only when such a signal is being transmitted only for
reception by the special interests of the industrial, mercantile, transporta-
tion, or other subscribers without any intention of reception by the general
public. This would be the case with all transmissions on a multiplex
basis.
The Commission's statement was cited with approval in 264 F. Supp. at 41 (empha-
sis added).
87. 264 F. Supp. at 40. It should be noted that Functional Music wanted the
court to view its programming as intended for the use of the general public and, as
such, broadcasting. Functional wanted this interpretation to be made by the court
so that Functional could avoid the impact of the FCC rules requiring that simplex
operators switch over to a multiplex system. In contrast, KMLA desired the court
to find its operation as nonbroadcasting because KMLA did not intend its pro-
gramming for the use of the general public and needed the protections afforded by
§ 605. Functional Music might well have acted as KMLA did with respect to its
court request if its service was being intercepted and made use of against their
interests as a subscription radio service. See also 264 F. Supp. at 40 n.1.
88. Id.
89. Following KMLA, other decisions also focused their inquiries on § 153(o)
and its definition of what broadcasting meant, never once questioning if § 153(o)'s
definition of broadcasting was really applicable to the word broadcasting as it was
found in § 605. See note 71 supra.
90. 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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censed affiliate preventing it from intercepting its transmissions.91
The MDS system used by HBO transmitted a high frequency sig-
nal from HBO's main antenna to its affiliates' authorized recep-
tion points nearby. After signal receipt, HBO licensees would
retransmit the signal at a lower frequency to allow for reception
by HBO subscribers.92 Finding Pay TV in violation of section 605,
the court cited an FCC ruling which had determined that MDS
transmissions were protected from unauthorized interception, 93
presumably because that type of transmission was considered to
be point-to-point.94 Furthermore, citing KMLA with approval, the
court reasoned that section 605 applied 95 because "[t]here is no
reason why the result [ (finding a violation of section 605)] should
be different in the case of television 96 transmissions."9 7
Another case decided in 1979, Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box
Office (HBO) ,98 on facts 99 practically identical to those in Pay TV,
the court reached an opposite result concerning the viability of a
claim that MDS type subscription television transmissions were
protected from unauthorized interceptions under section 605. The
court stated: "[t]he principle issue raised by this claim [that
Orth-O-Vision's unauthorized use of HBO's MDS signal was in vi-
olation of section 605] is whether HBO's radio communications
are 'broadcast', i.e., intended to be received' 00 by the general pub-
lic and, therefore, exempted from the protections of § 605."101
In answering that question, the Ortho-O-Vision court looked
91. HBO and Pay TV had entered into a licensing agreement whereby HBO
would allow Pay TV to receive and retransmit the signal by cable to its own cus-
tomers. Pay TV's customers were actually the owners or operators of large apart-
ment buildings, and these buildings offered cable services which were supplied to
the building by Pay TV. HBO and Pay TV had a disagreement, and HBO ex-
pressly directed Pay TV to cease its interception and use of the HBO signal. Pay
TV ignored the wishes of HBO.
92. 467 F. Supp. at 526.
93. Id. at 528. A Public Notice dated January 24, 1979, ruled that the intercep-
tion of MDS television signals was a violation of § 605. Id.
94. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
95. 467 F. Supp. at 528.
96. See note 41 supra.
97. 467 F. Supp. at 528.
98. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. See id. at 675-78.
100. The phrase intended to be received again proves that, up to this time, most
courts held broadcast to be § 153(o)'s equivalent. See note 71 supra and accompa-
nying text.
101. 474 F. Supp. at 681.
first to section 605.102 Recognizing that it needed to meet the is-
sue of what constituted "broadcasting," the court cited the Func-
tional Music doctrine that a transmission was still to be
considered broadcasting, even where the interplay of special de-
vices is considerable, if the originator intended the transmission
to be received by the public. Questioning whether the converse
of the above rule is true,103 the court asked: "does the transmis-
sion of programming which is of interest to the general public
constitute 'broadcasting' even though one cannot view the pro-
grams without paying a fee for special equipment?" 0 4 The court
solved the question based on a passage of an FCC ruling made in
1966.105 The FCC, in the court's opinion, 0 6 had determined STV
type subscription transmissions to be broadcasting as contem-
plated by section 153(o). Utilizing this FCC ruling, the court dis-
posed of HBO's section 605 claim by analogizing HBO's MDS
system to the operating characteristics of STV.107 The court be-
lieved that STV was broadcasting for the purposes of section 605's
exception and presumably in the opinion of the FCC.108 There-
fore, because the MDS format was sufficiently similar to STV, ac-
cording to the Orth-O-Vision court, it was broadcasting outside
the scope of section 605.
The Orth-O-Vision court professed to be in search of HBO's in-
tent, but in fact the court disregarded that completely. The court
chose instead to adopt an FCC ruling, made in a different con-
text,109 which is unsatisfactory when used to invalidate a finding
102. Id. at 680.
103. Id. at 681-82.
104. Id.
105. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 3
F.C.C. 2d 1 (1966). This report provides:
the evident intention of any station transmitting subscription programs
would be to make them available to all members of the public within range
of the station .... [TIhe primary touchstone of a broadcast service is the
intent of the broadcaster to provide radio or television service without dis-
crimination to as many members of the general public as can be inter-
ested in the particular program as distinguished from a point-to-point
message service [i.e., multiplex radio service] to specified individuals
.... '[IIntent' may be iqferred from the circumstances under which mate-
rial is transmitted... (emphasis added).
474 F. Supp. at 682.
106. Later decisions noted that the FCC made this determination in response
to television broadcasters who claimed that the FCC could not allow STV to use
allocated television frequencies because STV was not broadcasting and not in re-
gard to whether or not STV was broadcasting for purposes of the proviso. See
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 464-66 (6th Cir.
1980).
107. 474 F. Supp. at 682.
108. The FCC never specifically stated in the 1966 report that it was deciding
whether STV was broadcasting for § 605 purposes. See 637 F.2d at 464.
109. 474 F. Supp. at 682. See also note 106 supra.
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that MDS transmissions should be accorded protective status
under section 605. The FCC ruling used by the court did not even
address the issue of whether STV was incapable of protection by
section 605.110 Furthermore, though STV and MDS are both tele-
vision transmissions, the comparison is short-lived. STV signals
can be received by any conventional television set1 1' and are
broadcast to be received by many subscribers. In contrast, MDS
signals, as used by HBO, cannot be picked up by any television
set but can, generally, only be received by special antennas man-
ufactured to receive those high frequency signals. Moreover,
HBO's MDS system was designed to and did transmit to only a
handful of licensed affiliates, unlike STV, which generally broad-
casts to many thousands of subscribers. It would seem that the
court should have followed the lead of the Pay TV court and held
HBO's MDS transmissions to be point-to-point transmissions
within the protective sphere of section 605.112
The law was in a state of flux after the Pay TV and Orth-O- Vi-
sion decisions. Not until Chartwell Communications Group v.
Westbrook,113 decided in 1980, did the law begin to stabilize into a
cogent approach to the unauthorized use of subscription televi-
sion broadcasts. Chartwell was the first case to decide the issue
of whether STV broadcasts were protected from unauthorized in-
terception.114 Chartwell involved an STV operator who fied suit
against defendant Westbrook, alleging that Westbrook had been
engaged in selling unauthorized electronic decoding equipment
capable of allowing non-Chartwell subscribers to receive
Chartwell's STV broadcast in enjoyable form.
The court refused to adhere to the ruling as set forth by the
Orth-O-Vision court concerning STV and its relationship to sec-
tions 605 and 153(o).115 The Chartwell court stated:
The FCC has not ruled specifically on the question of whether STV is to
be considered "broadcasting" for the purposes of Section 605 ... [and]
[wIe do not read the FCC's pronouncements on this matter to foreclose a
110. Id.
111. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 90-97 supra and accompanying text.
113. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 462. Functional and KMLA both involved radio subscription serv-
ices. The former used a simplex system and the latter used a multiplex system.
Pay TV and Orth.O-Vision involved subscription television services, but the ser-
vice involved was an MDS system which is similar to STV but not completely cor-
relative. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
determination that STV is protected by Section 605 ... [f] urthermore,
even if the FCC's determination could be interpreted as a ruling that STV
is broadcasting for Section 605 purposes, we are not bound by the agency's
interpretation. 1 1 6
In analyzing the case before it, the Chartwell court was the first
court to scrutinize the exception in section 605 as it stood.117
Chartwell focused on the language of the exception, "for the use
of the general public," instead of substituting in section 153(o)'s
"intent" definition of broadcasting.118 The Chartwell court admit-
ted that STV broadcasting was aimed at a large audience but re-
fused to agree with the contention made by Westbrook that the
transmissions made by Chartwell were intended for the use of the
general public (free of charge).1 9 The Orth-O-Vision court, by
failing to do that, fell into the pitfall of holding subscription televi-
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118. "[Tlhere is an important distinction between making a service available to
the general public and intending a program for the use of the general public." 637
F.2d at 465.
119. Id.
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sion services as outside the scope of section 605 simply because
the signal was appealable to a mass audience, and the inference
was made that because of the large appeal it was intended to be
received by the public.120
Considering the Chartwell decision, the state of the law with re-
gard to section 605 protection of electronic subscription services
seemed unified, excepting the decision reached in Orth-O-Vision.
Although the jurisdictions that had examined the question of
electronic subscription service interception were generally in
agreement, those cases were few and, in regard to subscription
type television services, the cases were mixed. Therefore, before
the law would become cohesive, another decision on the problem
would be needed.
III. NATIONAL SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION V. S & H, TV
The greater Los Angeles metropolitan area is a prime source of
revenue for those businesses catering to the entertainment de-
mands of the people of that area. Not only is the city the third
largest in the United States,121 but it is also the acknowledged
leader in this nation, and most would agree the world, in the en-
tertainment field. With this backdrop, cable television companies
entered the Los Angeles market with great expectations in the
1970's. One of those companies was National Subscription Televi-
sion (NST).
NST was the owner and operator of a subscription television
service marketed under the copyrighted name of "ON TV." To fa-
cilitate the transmission of its signal, NST entered into an agree-
ment with Oak Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (Oak Broadcasting),
whereby Oak Broadcasting would allow NST to transmit its STV
program using the transmission facilities of Oak Broadcasting.
Oak Broadcasting was licensed ,to broadcast television signals on
its designated UHF frequency122 and permitted NST the use of its
transmitter during certain hours of the day.123
Decoding devices were provided to NST subscribers on a rental
basis enabling them to view the programming. Because the signal
transmitted by NST was carried on a special subfrequency carrier
120. See note 192 infra.
121. The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1982, at 202 (1981).
122. The frequency is UHF Channel 52 in Los Angeles.
123. These hours are primarily from early afternoon to late evening.
wave, adequate reception of "ON TV" programming was limited
to those who were NST subscribers or those who were in posses-
sion of equipment capable of decoding NST's signal. With the
special signal and the customer's use of the decoding devices,
NST had hoped to prevent unauthorized access to its
programming.
S & H, TV124 was a producer and distributor of decoding devices
functionally equivalent to those supplied to NST customers.
However, NST had not authorized S & H, TV to produce or dis-
tribute those devices. This "bootlegging" activity allowed S & H,
TV customers to "pirate" the NST scrambled signals without hav-
ing to pay NST's subscription rate. Those pirates then were able
to intercept the programming of "ON TV" with no cost to them-
selves, except monies expended for the purchase of the decoders.
Learning of the acts committed by S & H, TV, NST and Oak
Broadcasting filed an action in the federal district court request-
ing injunctive and compensatory damage relief pursuant to sec-
tion 605.125 Upon a hearing of the case, it was determined that
section 605 was not applicable to the facts of the case and that the
acts of S & H, TV were, therefore, not in violation of federal rights
granted by that section.126 In applying section 605 to the facts of
the case, the district court felt that the exception was controlling
and, therefore, the signals broadcast by NST were outside the
blanket of protection offered by section 605.127 Dissatisfied with
the result, NST appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL
A. The Parties' Contentions
S & H, TV argued that "NST's programming is of interest to a
mass audience" and that such programming was capable of being
received by anyone who owned a television set.128 Because of
NST's transmission format, which was directed to a mass audi-
ence, S & H, TV contended that NST was broadcasting within the
124. The complaint named S & H, TV as a defendant along with many others.
National Subscription Television v. S & H, TV, No. CV 80-829-LTL (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
1980). For the purpose of simplicity, "S & H, TV" will be used hereinafter to refer
to the defendants collectively.
125. In conjunction with the federal claim NST ied numerous state claims.
126. Upon a hearing of the case at the district court level, it was determined
that § 605 was not applicable to the facts of the case. In so holding, the court
granted S & H, TV's request that the case be dismissed pursuant to the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6). National Subscription Television v. S & H, TV
No. CV 80-829-LTL (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1980).
127. Id.
128. 644 F.2d at 821.
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parameters of section 153(o).129 Moreover, S & H, TV asserted
that broadcasting, as defined by section 153(o), was synonymous
with the meaning of the word broadcasting found in the excep-
tion to section 605. Therefore, according to S & H, TV, if the sig-
nals transmitted by NST were considered as broadcasting
pursuant to section 153(o) and if all section 153(o) broadcasting
was considered broadcasting for the purposes of section 605's ex-
ception, then those types of signals were "unprotected by the gen-
eral prohibition against signal interception in section 605."130
The first contention by S & H, TV, that NST's signals should be
considered as section 153(o) broadcasting, was a reasonable one
in view of prior case law,13 1 i.e., Functional Music.132 However,
the argument loses much of its force when the qualification of
"only for those who are willing to pay the subscription fee" is
introduced.
Assuming arguendo the first contention is valid, then are all
section 153(o) broadcasts necessarily broadcasts as contemplated
by section 605's exception? Section 153(o) defines broadcasts as
those "intended to be received by the public," 133 whereas the sec-
tion 605 exception limits broadcasts to broadcasts transmitted for
the use of the general public.1 34 It is possible to have an elec-
tronic communication fall within the context of section 153(o) and
still be outside of the section 605 exception, even if the concept of
broadcast, as it is found in section 605, is defined by section
153(o).135 STV is a good example. STV transmissions are in-
tended to be received by the (general) public subject to the quali-
fication that those broadcasts are meant only for those willing to
pay the subscription fee. Given this, merely because a broadcast
is made with the intent that it be received by the general public
does not mean that it is meant for the use of that audience. The
strength of this position revolves around what is the meaning of
for the use of the general public. Because the purpose of the sec-
tion 605 exception was to exempt advertisement based television
129. Similar to prior cases, National assumed that § 153(o) was determinative
of what the proviso meant by "broadcasting." Id. See also notes 102-08 supra and
accompanying text.
130. 644 F.2d at 821. See also note 129 supra.
131. Id.
132. See notes 81 & 82 supra and accompanying text.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o).
134. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
and radio from the application of section 605,136 then, inferen-
tially,for the use of the general public means broadcasts transmit-
ted for the public's use free of charge. This would entail that STV
could be broadcast with the intent to be received by the general
public, but remain within the exception because it is not intended
for the use of the general public.13 7 Thus, the contention by S &
H, TV, that broadcasting under sections 605 and 153(o) is synony-
mous, was not a tenable one.
NST also grounded its argument on the basis of section 153(o)
and its intent component. 138 NST argued that the mass appeal of
its programming should be ignored by the court and that the
court should instead look to the intent of NST behind its broad-
casts. NST averred that because it had instituted measures at-
tempting to "restrict reception of its signals to paying
subscribers," 139 there could be no justified finding of section
153(o) intent. Furthermore, NST stressed that because there was
no intent to broadcast as provided by section 153(o), the excep-
tion was ineffective and their signal was thus entitled to protec-
tion via section 605.140 What was problematical was the
reasonableness in deducing that NST intended its programming
to be received by the public, although conditioned on the pay-
ment of a subscription fee.
The arguments made by both parties were oriented toward sec-
tion 153(o)'s definitive correlation to the exception of section 605.
Neither party attempted to distinguish section 153(o)'s definition
of broadcasting from the concept of broadcasting as found within
the exception.141 The parties believed that the case would turn on
whether the court found NST to have intended its programming
for the use of the general public. The court, however, drew a dis-
tinction between broadcasting as defined by section 153(o) and
broadcasting as contemplated by the section 605 exception. 142
NST's intent was relied upon in conjunction with the distinction
the court made in deciding the case, with neither the court's own
conclusions regarding the relationship between sections 605 and
153(o) or NST's intent carrying more weight than the other.143
136. Brief for Appellant at 4, National Subscription Television v. S & H, TV, 644
F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
137. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
138. 644 F.2d at 821.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The appellants' brief indicated their awareness of the distinction, although
no mention is made of this in the case as reported.
142. 644 F.2d at 824. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
143. The court did review the importance of the sender's intent, but because it
also found section 153(o) to be noncontrolling of the scope of section 605, it was
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B. Applicable Legislative and Decisional Law
Surveying the available law relevant to a proper disposition of
the case, the National court observed that there was marginal
case law on the subject and that the legislative history of section
605 had made no mention of whether STV transmissions were
within its protective sphere.'" KMLA was cited by the National
court as the first reported decision to discuss the relationship be-
tween section 605 and subscription broadcasting.145 Evaluating
KMLA, where that court had found the particular communication
at issue to be protected by section 605, the National court made a
comparison of the programming format used in KMLA (mul-
tiplexing) and the format used by NST (STV).146 NST, like the
subscription operator in KMLA, contended that its signal was not
broadcast to be received by the general public and should be
treated as within the protections of section 605. The National
court emphasized that the ruling arrived at in KMLA was pre-
mised on the sender's lack of intent to make the broadcast avail-
able for the use of the general public, 47 rather than on the mass
appeal of the service offered. 48 However, the KMLA court had a
stronger factual foundation than the NST court to find that the
subscription operator lacked intent to broadcast to the general
public. The subscription operator in KMLA used a multiplex sys-
tem of broadcasting, making it impossible for conventional radios
to receive the signal.149 NST's signal, however, was capable of be-
ing received by any television set, albeit in scrambled form.
Therefore, because of this fundamental difference in the operat-
ing nature of the two services, more would have to be shown if
the National court were to make a strong analogy between its
own case and KMLA. Accomplishing that end, the court noted
that NST's signal, though capable of being received by all conven-
tional television sets, was transmitted in scrambled form, requir-
free to evaluate the case on a basis other than the sender's intent. See text accom-
panying note 188 infra.
144. Presumably this included all subscription oriented television transmis-
sions, not only STV. 644 F.2d at 822.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court did not make an obvious comparison of the two subscription
services, but was drawing an analogy for its later discussion of a broadcaster's
intent.
147. Id. This was evidenced by the need for special equipment if the public
wished to receive the signal.
148. 264 F. Supp. at 41-42.
149. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
ing the need for special devices if one desired to intelligently view
the programming. Therefore, though the burden of showing
broadcaster lack of intent was greater, NST could be viewed as
lacking intent to have its signal used by the general public be-
cause of the additional restraints placed on its signals. Thus, the
court's rationale remained consistent with the decision in
KMLA .150
The National court viewed Pay TV 151 to be of limited compara-
tive value because the defendant in that case, Pay TV of Greater
New York, had failed to argue that the plaintiffs signal (HBO's
MDS transmissions) were encompassed by the exception to sec-
tion 605.152 Pay TV was of more than limited significance, espe-
cially in the area probed and discussed by the court in National.
The Pay TV court said "[n]o court appears heretofore to have had
occasion to apply. . section [605] to television transmissions." 5 3
On that basis alone the case was of great importance. True, Pay
TV did not assert the common defense, claimed by similarly situ-
ated defendants,5 4 that the communications made by HBO were
section 153(o) broadcastings and, therefore, within the reach of
the exception. However, the Pay TV court did mention that the
plaintiffs did "not deny that Section 605 prohibits an unauthor-
ized person from intercepting the signals carrying [HBO's] pro-
gram service.' 155
Continuing to keep the issue of programming mass appeal ver-
sus broadcaster intent at the forefront of the case, the National
court reviewed the applicability of the Orth-O-Vision decision.I5 6
National noted that the Orth-O-Vision court had pushed aside
the fact that special equipment was needed for the receipt of the
plaintiffs signal and, alternatively, had decided to direct its atten-
tion to the character of the plaintiffs (HBO's) programming and
the signal delivery system's capabilities. 5 7 The National court
then proceeded to discuss the Functional Music' 5 8 case and the
FCC report made in 1966,159 citing both to have been relied on by
the Orth-O-Vision court in its decision1 60
150. Both cases relied on the broadcaster-plaintiff's lack of intent in deciding
their respective cases. See 644 F.2d at 824.
151. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
152. 644 F.2d at 822.
153. 467 F. Supp. at 528.
154. United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464.
155. 467 F. Supp. at 528.
156. See also note 98 supra and accompanying text.
157. 644 F.2d at 822-23.
158. 644 F.2d at 823. See also note 72 supra and accompanying text.
159. Id. See note 105 supra.
160. 644 F.2d at 822.
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National interpreted Functional Music as standing for the prop-
osition that, although contrary to a previously rendered FCC rul-
ing on point,161 a simplex subscription music service was
broadcasting for the purposes of section 153(o), and notwithstand-
ing that some persons using Functional Music's program were
able to delete portions of the program, the program was still to be
considered as appealing to a widespread radio audience.162 That
explains why S & H, TV and the Orth-O-Vision court attached so
much significance to a program's audience appeal.163
The 1966 FCC report was used by the National court in its anal-
ysis of how much weight should be given to a sender's restriction
of programming access when determining the sender's intent.16 4
The National court found the FCC decision to hold that an STV
broadcaster's restriction of a signal is not enough to negate a find-
ing of STV transmissions as section 153(o) broadcasting.165
National credited the Chartwell 66 and United States v. West-
brook167 decisions as the most recent cases decided concerning
STV transmissions, unauthorized interception of this type of com-
munication, and the availability of section 605 and its prohibition
against unauthorized interceptions.168 Of special value was the
court's recognition of the almost identical factual situations of
Chartwell, Westbrook, and its own case.169 The National court
also stated that both decisions had found STV as not susceptible
161. Id. at 823.
162. Does widespread appeal necessarily mean widespread appeal to the gen-
eral public, or could it mean additionally widespread appeal only to those who
would be predisposed to purchase the service offered?
163. Functional Music has been acknowledged as the leading case to discern
what the legal definition of broadcasting entails. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Functional Music court used both broadcaster intent and appealability of the
service in holding a type of subscription service as broadcasting within the ambit
of section 153(o). 274 F.2d at 548. See also note 81 supra and accompanying text.
164. 644 F.2d at 823.
165. Id.
166. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
167. 502 F. Supp. 588. Westbrook involved a criminal prosecution by the FCC
against some individuals who were marketing decoders capable of unscrambling
STV emissions. The FCC based its case on several suppositions. It argued that
federal regulations required that STV decoders be leased and inspected before
distribution. The FCC also asserted that the defendants had violated section 605
in assisting others in the interception of broadcasts not intended for the general
public. This prosecution by the FCC is consistent with its Staff Report, see note
206 infra and accompanying text (but is not consistent with its still official position
espoused in 1965, see note 105 supra and accompanying text).
168. 644 F.2d at 823.
169. Id.
to inclusion within the section 605 exception and, as such, was to
be accorded protected status under section 605.170
The National court analyzed the positive (lack of intent) and
the negative (widespread appeal) attributes of STV broadcasts;
and how those characteristics had been interpreted by previous
decisions. Orth-O-Vision had relied heavily on the audience ap-
peal of STV. While the Orth-O-Vision court had denied section
605 relief for STV type transmissions, the Chartwell and West-
brook decisions had given relief to STV transmissions under sec-
tion 605 irrespective of audience appeal, insisting that the
sender's intent was all important.171 The National court followed
the lead of the Chartwell court by directing its inquiry more to-
ward NST's intent than toward its wholesale appeal to a mass
audience.
C. Section 605 Protection
1. Distinguishing the meaning of broadcast under section 605
from section 153(o)
The National court refused to consider NST's broadcasts as
outside the protections of section 605. The court stated that the
framework of analysis employed by
[s]ome of the cases dealing with sections 153(o) and 605 is that trans-
missions that constitute broadcasting within the meaning of 153(o) fall
within the [exception] . .. [sic] [of] 605, and, therefore, are unprotected,
whereas transmissions that do not amount to 153(o) broadcasting are out
of the [exception's] reach, and thus are protected by 605.172
The court found NST to be in agreement with that analysis.173
However, NST had asked the court to specifically overrule the
FCC's determination that STV was broadcasting for the purposes
of section 153(o).174 In support of its request, NST cited Func-
tional Music, which had specifially overruled an FCC ruling on
point. Such authority seemed to be appealing at first but turned
out to be quixotical. In Functional Music, the FCC had said that
the programming found in Functional Music175 did not constitute
broadcasting as interpreted by the Commission and, therefore,
could not be legally broadcast via Functional's allocated FM fre-
quency.176 In reversing that FCC holding, the Functional Music
court declared that the intent to broadcast within the meaning of
170. Id.
171. 637 F.2d at 465; 502 F. Supp. at 590-92.
172. 644 F.2d at 823.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See note 73 supra.
176. 274 F.2d at 545.
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section 153(o) could not be discounted merely due to the station's
specialized programming. Functional sought to be considered as
broadcasting transmissions intended to be received by the gen-
eral public in opposition to the applicable FCC determination.177
In National, however, NST sought just the opposite classifica-
tion. The FCC regulation at issue in National stated STV was
broadcasting for the purposes of section 153(o)178 based on the
supposed intent of NST that its signal be received by the general
populace, and was, hence, within the exception. NST asked that
the FCC ruling be overruled or limited because if STV were found
to be broadcasting pursuant to the exception, it would be vulnera-
ble to outright acts of piracy with no federal prohibitions to re-
strain such activities.179 NST desired to be considered as
broadcasting only to a limited extent, enough to be within the am-
bit of section 605, but not quite enough to be withdrawn from the
section's protections by the exception. Therein lies the distinc-
tion between National and Functional Music. Both plaintiffs in
the respective cases wanted the applicable FCC rulings over-
turned, but they pursued that result for entirely different reasons.
Functional wanted its broadcasting to be considered as intended
for the use of the general public, while NST did not want its
broadcasting to be so classified.
Conveniently side stepping the issue of whether the court
should overrule the FCC decision that STV was 153(o) broadcast-
ing, the court found that section 153(o) was nondispositive of the
scope of the section 605 exception.' 8 0 The National court was inti-
mating that section 153(o) broadcasting and broadcasting as en-
compassed by the exception of section 605 could have different
meanings.181 Besides holding that section 153(o) was not the con-
clusive definition of what constituted broadcasting under the sec-
tion 605 exception, 8 2 the court cited the Chartwell decision183 in
support of its decision not to address the merits of the FCC deci-
sion directly. The Chartwell decision had clarified the context
within which the FCC determination was made. The purpose of
the FCC's report was to decide whether STV should be granted
177. 274 F.2d at 545-46.
178. 644 F.2d at 823. See note 159 supra.
179. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
180. 644 F.2d at 823-24.
181. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
182. See note 19 supra.
183. 644 F.2d at 824.
permanent access to national markets, and if so, whether the FCC
had the authority to govern STV.184 The issue of whether STV
should be protected from unauthorized interception was not ad-
dressed by the FCC's ruling. The Chartwell court refused to find
the FCC report as determinative of whether STV was to be pro-
tected by section 605.185 Because the National court relied on
Chartwell, it could not be said that it was attempting to avoid
making a ruling on the FCC report; Chdrtwell, for all its rhetoric,
simply said, "we are not bound by the [FCC's] interpretation." 8 6
The National court observed that "an individual might 'broad-
cast'-i.e., transmit a signal over the airwaves with the intent that
it be received by the public within the meaning of section
153(o)-without such broadcasting being for the use of the [gen-
eral] public within the meaning of the [exception] ."187 That rea-
soning would become the all controlling thought which reduced
the problem to a simple issue. Did STV broadcast its signal for
the use of the general public? In answering that question the Na-
tional court made a number of observations.
Like most profit motivated enterprises, the court argued, 8 8 an
STV operator will develop his product to appeal to a large group
of consumers. Therefore, it only makes sense to conclude that
STV is produced and intended to be marketed to a large pool of
customers. Moreover, the court reasoned, even though STV is
aimed at the general populace, it does not necessarily follow that
STV operators intend STV programming for the use of that mass
audience without a charge for the service.189 Taking judicial no-
tice of the economics and financial elements of the case, the court
shored up its position further when it posited that an STV opera-
tion would be inviable without the assistance of encoded signals
and decoding devices, supplied to subscribers, for protecting the
transmission from easy accessibility. 190 Finally, the court held
that "STV operations such as NST broadcast their programming,
not for the use of anyone who is somehow able to receive their
signals, but only for the use of paying subscribers."191 By viewing
NST's operations in that manner, the court allowed for a reason-
able inference to be drawn, namely that NST did not intend its
broadcasts for the use of the general public. By refusing to distin-
184. 637 F.2d at 464.
185. Id. at 464-65.
186. Id. at 465.
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guish between intent to have the public receive a certain broad-
cast and intent for the public to use a particular broadcast, the
National court avoided a pitfall which the Orth-O-Vision court
had fallen into.192 Implicit in the National court's argument is the
notion that STV operators only intend that their programs be
used by those of the public willing to pay for the service.
Discussing further differences between sections 153(o) and 605,
the court addressed a contention made by S & H, TV. S & H, TV
argued that if the court were to keep separate the phrases "in-
tended to be received by the public"'193 and "broadcast ... for the
use of the general public,"'1 94 the purpose of the exception would
be misconstrued by the court.195 S & H, TV stressed that the word
broadcast as embodied in the exception was a distinct term and
that the phrase for the use of the general public was meant to
qualify transnitted, not broadcast, because those words were ar-
ranged within the phraseology of the exception.19 6 The court dis-
missed S & H, TV's claim. The court admitted that the language
of the section 605 exception might be strained. In spite of that,
the language imparts the principle that providing programming
for the general public at a price, on one hand, and intending that
the program be used by the general public free of cost, on the
other hand, are diametrically opposed.197
2. Public Policy Consideration
Policy considerations of promoting the public interest and pro-
tection of the consumer were also viewed as important by the Na-
tional court.198 Entrusted with the implementation of those
policies, the FCC issued some preliminary reports and statements
of policy with regard to the STV industry in the 1960's. 199 In 1980,
the FCC issued a Staff Report which evidenced a change in FCC
policy with respect to STV.200 The 1980 Staff Report announced
that the FCC believed STV to be in the public interest because it
192. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
193. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976).
194. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
195. 644 F.2d at 824.
196. Id. at 825.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See notes 59 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
200. FCC Staff Report on Policies for Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites
124 n.17 (Sept. 1980).
was an alternative programming source in which the public had
shown interest.201 Additionally, the Staff Report, which had not
been adopted as the official position of the FCC, stated that there
was no reason not to include STV within the protective realm of
section 605 like other forms of communication had been.20 2 An-
other rule promulgated by the FCC was that an STV operator
could not sell decoding devices but had to lease them instead.20 3
Applying these FCC rulings to the facts of the case, the court held
that S & H, TV was in violation of public policy, and, as such, their
acts of manufacturing and marketing decoders could not be toler-
ated.204 By using public policy, the court made a novel interpreta-
tion in its discussion of unauthorized interception of STV
broadcasts. 205 Public policy, combined with the economic factors
cited earlier by the court, made for a strong decision that STV op-
erations were to be protected under section 605.
Three countervailing policy arguments posed by S & H, TV,
were also discussed in National. Those policy considerations
were: (1) that the airwaves belong to the general public, and
therefore those who do transmit over the airwaves, such as NST,
should be prevented from exercising monopolistic control over
the airwaves absent congressional approval; (2) Congress in-
tended that STV programmers use technological means to pre-
vent access to their signal; and (3) the actions of S & H, TV
helped to foster needed competition in the manufacture of
decoders.206
Responding to the first issue of whether Congress should have
to approve of the use of the public airwaves by STV operators, the
201. In reaching its conclusion [In re Amendment of Part 73] that STV is
broadcasting, the Commission stated that it regarded a [broadcasting] li-
censee's 'intent to provide a radio or television service without discrimina-
tion to as many members of the general public as can be interested in the
programs' as of primary importance to its determination. However, this
conclusion appears to ignore the fact that, although a licensee's overall
service (including adapter, decoder, or converter) may be offered to the
public generally, nevertheless, his actual radio transmissions, by them-
selves, may not be intended for general public reception .... It also
seems clear that there is no distinguishing factor that would justify the
exclusion of STV programming, but not the subscription programming
transmitted by other licensees, from the protections afforded by Section
605 ....
644 F.2d at 824 n.5. See note 119 supra.
202. Id.
203. See note 12 supra.
204. 644 F.2d at 825.
205. Generally, other courts dealing with the subject did not invoke policy to
make a decision, but rather concentrated their efforts on the linguistical and con-
ceptual applications of §§ 153(o) and 605.
206. 644 F.2d at 826.
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court addressed several factors. 20 7 As a licensed broadcaster, Oak
Broadcasting already had the right to refuse or allow access to
those wishing to use its allocated frequency, and that right nulli-
fied any argument that Oak Broadcasting was exercising a right it
did not have.208 Expanding on that, the court noted that section
605 does not grant any broadcaster, including STV operators, a
monopoly over the airwaves because it does not prevent other
broadcasters from entering the market.209 Furthermore, the FCC
and Congress were charged with overseeing the use of the public
airwaves to insure that they be used in the public's best inter-
est.210 Delegating its authority, Congress granted the FCC the
power to regulate the public airwaves in its best judgment. STV
broadcasting was a communications medium recognized by the
FCC as entitled to the use of the limited broadcast spectrum.211
Therefore, there was no reason why Congress needed to specifi-
cally authorize the use of the airwaves by STV operators.
In reply to the second argument, the court discounted as specu-
lative and unsubstantiated the contention that Congress intended
STV operators to protect their signals solely by the use of special
electronic equipment.212 The court stated that "even the most
technologically sophisticated decoder can be copied by processes
of reverse engineering."213
The last contention of policy made by S & H, TV, that their ac-
tivities provided needed competition in the manufacture of decod-
ers, was held to be untenable by the court.214 If S & H, TV was
allowed to continue in the manufacture of decoders capable of
transceiving NST's encoded signal, such activity would eventually
have the effect of causing NST and other STV operators to cease
business operations and "would eliminate the reason for acquir-
ing [(referring to the consumer)] the decoder in the first
place." 215
207. Id. See also text accompanying note 211 infra.
208. 644 F.2d at 826.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.




D. No Violation of 605?
Notwithstanding that NST's signals were protected by section
605, the National court examined the possibility that the lower
court's dismissal of the case might be correct if S & H, TV were
found not to have intercepted the signal of NST.216 Under section
605, one is not accountable until it is proven that he intercepted,
divulged, or published the transmission, or aided others in the in-
tercepting, divulging, or publishing of the transmission.217 S & H,
TV attempted to escape liability under section 605 by theorizing:
one, all television sets in the Los Angeles area could already re-
ceive NST's signals, and therefore, S & H, TV had no opportunity
to intercept or aid in the interception of those signals; and two,
they did not divulge, publish, or aid in the interception of NST's
signals.218 The National court found these arguments to be un-
convincing. The court used common sense in stating that S & H,
TV was obviously aiding others in the interception of NST pro-
gramming. Almost casually, the court suggested that S & H, TV
may have had a good argument if they had asserted that the de-
coders sold had never been used.219
V. IMPACT OF THE CASE
National may well have been the final judicial impetus neces-
sary for the FCC to reverse its prior official position with respect
to subscription television.220 Given this judicial prodding, the
FCC should adopt a new posture, as was urged in its own 1980
Staff Report.221 If the FCC would act in that way, courts which
had placed great weight on the 1966 ruling of the FCC222 would
probably make an about face and move to protect STV broadcasts
from unauthorized interception. Despite the current FCC stance
concerning STV as a telecommunications medium, some courts
have refused to blindly follow the FCC and, to their credit, have
taken the initiative in placing STV within the protective scheme
of section 605.223 The National decision, in accepting and adopt-
ing the logic and policy of the Chartwell, Westbrook, Functional,
216. Id.
217. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
218. 644 F.2d at 826.
219. Id. at 827.
220. Although the FCC first recognized STV as a broadcast transmission for
purposes of licensing, defendants in such cases continue to argue that § 605 should
not apply. See notes 62 & 105 supra.
221. See notes 200-02 supra and accompanying text.
222. Few courts were completely swayed by the FCC ruling in 1966, i.e. Orth-0-
Vision, but many were cognizant of its value in detailing the Commission's posi-
tion on the matter, i.e., Westbrook, Chartwell, and National.
223. See notes 95 & 116 supra and accompanying text.
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and KMLA decisions, gives further weight to the decisions in
those cases. In light of those foregoing cases, it appears that
there is now an ample body of case law dealing with the subject
of unauthorized interception of broadcasts as contrasted to the
situation the early courts had found themselves confronted
with-scarce case law and unmalleable FCC determinations.
After the National decision, most courts should severely limit
the persuasiveness of the Orth-O-Vision decision. Orth-O-Vision
should be looked upon as an anomalous decision where a court
refused to consider the dire economic consequences that follow
when the 1966 ruling of the FCC is applied mechanically. The
cable industry will breath a sigh of relief when Orth-O-Vision is
relegated to that debilitated status by the courts, although few
courts have done so to this date.224
Although the technology already exists which allows cable tele-
vision subscribers to "talk back"22 5 to their television, "shop at
home," 22 6 and leave home while the house is protected from un-
wanted intruders,2 27 cable television, as a technology, is still in its
infancy. Soon people will be able to accomplish their banking,
record keeping, and schooling through the use of cable television
networks. These current and future innovations will all give rise
to new problems. Currently, it is the STV originator of television
programming who is most concerned with the undue interception
of STV signals, but with the expansion of subscription television
capabilities there will be others interested in the prevention of
unauthorized interception of STV or STV type signals. House-
wives, homeowners, and businessmen, all of whom may transmit
or receive sensitive information, may all be in need of the protec-
tions established under section 605. Hopefully, future courts,
when confronted with any one of those possibilities, will not re-
frain from adopting the law so clearly illustrated in National. The
law, if it is to be effective, should not be lagging behind the needs
of a technologically inspired civilization.
Finally, the reverberations to be felt throughout the STV indus-
try should be widespread and penetrating. In an industry in-
224. 502 F. Supp. at 591; 637 F.2d at 465-66.
225. Yao, Two-Way Cable TV Disappoints Viewers in Columbus Ohio As Pro-
gramming Lags, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1981, § 2, at 27, col. 4 (Western ed.).
226. Cooney, With Video Shopping Services, Foods You See on the Screen can
Be Delivered to Your Door, Wall St. J., July 14, 1981, § 2, at 48, col. 1 (Western ed.).
227. See note 225, supra.
volved so much in capital investment and royalty fees, it is
imperative that the courts act to protect the very lifeline that per-
mits the industry to exist. National allows STV operators a
chance to conduct their livelihoods without fear of judicially sanc-
tioned pirating. Practically speaking, few cases after National, in
which these same types of practices are involved, should reach
the trial stage of litigation. The law in this area is so well defined
subsequent to the STV cases 22 8 that a potential defendant is vir-
tually assured of losing based on this body of law, where the facts
are plain and show a clear instance of unauthorized interception
or the aiding of others in the interception of STV broadcasts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it appears that the question of whether subscription
television is protected by section 605 of the Communications Act
has been answered, there still remains the nagging question of
damages. None of the decisions rendered in this area can effect a
complete remedy. An attempt at complete rectification would
prove to be impractical because it is difficult to measure the eco-
nomic loss incurred in the past and continuing to be incurred in
the present when possibly thousands of decoders are still in cir-
culation with no reasonable means of tracing their current where-
abouts. Furthermore, how can those who purchased and used the
decoders to intercept STV broadcasts be adequately reprimanded
or forced to compensate the injured STV operator? These ques-
tions cannot be adequately remedied by the courts due to inher-
ent practical limitations. It seems likely, then, that the courts will
continue to administer injunctive relief and compute monetary
damages in an arbitrary fashion, at least until a method is devel-
oped which can measure, as near as possible, the true extent of
the injury suffered by the STV operator because of the unauthor-
ized interceptions of his signal.229
Those problems aside, who is to benefit the most by this devel-
opment in the law? On its face it would appear that subscription
television operators stand to benefit the most. But in reality, the
public will derive the bulk of the benefits to be realized. The STV
228. The National, Chartwell, and Westbrook decisions dealt with STV trans-
missions directly, whereas the other television subscription cases involved MDS
broadcasts.
229. It appears that the only possible way for an STV operator to cease provid-
ing continual free programming to the holders of the spurious decoders is to re-
vamp their broadcasting modulation and either modify their present decoders or
exchange new decoders for the old decoders previously supplied to subscribers.
As one can well imagine, this process could be very expensive, awkward, and in-
convenient for thousands of customers.
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industry will continue to gain tremendous revenues, especially if
its signals are protected by the law, but the public, by the
processes of the open market, will be able to purchase alternative
programming to that of commercially sponsored television. This
will enable the public to decide which product it prefers. The
courts, as epitomized by the National decision, have given the
consumer the opportunity to reject or accept STV type program-
ming in the open market by disallowing the manufacture or distri-
bution of unauthorized decoders by those who would wish to
capitalize on that form of communication piracy.
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